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Leveling the Playing Field between Merchants and
Customers in Pennsylvania Slip and Fall
Negligence Cases
INTRODUCTION
A customer injured in a slip and fall incident in a supermarket
in Pennsylvania will have to address a number of hurdles before he
wins a recovery for his injuries. The toughest hurdle will most
likely be the requirement of the Pennsylvania courts that the cus-
tomer establish that the merchant had notice before the incident
took place of the specific hazard which caused the plaintiff's fall,
and that the merchant then failed to take reasonable steps to cor-
rect it. This "notice" hurdle is often insurmountable and its exis-
tence unduly tilts the table in favor of the merchant. This author
submits that the Pennsylvania courts need to either apply the ex-
isting law in this area in a more even-handed fashion or change the
law to eliminate the bias against the consumer. Unless the court-
room playing field is leveled to give the injured customer a fighting
chance, slip and fall plaintiffs in Pennsylvania will continue to suf-
fer defeat before the court.
The basic tenet underlying negligence law in Pennsylvania, as
well as in the nation generally, is the notion that every individual
has a responsibility to see that the activities in which he or she
engages do not expose others to unreasonable risks of harm.1 This
concept is defined and limited in the area of civil tort litigation
through the application of two elements: (1) a supposedly liable
actor must first be found to have a duty to protect another from
the foreseeable results of the actor's conduct and (2) the actor
must fail to pursue reasonable efforts to fulfill that duty.2
In applying these general propositions, the courts and those
practicing therein have found it useful to create verbal definitions
and explanations of these general propositions as they apply to
specific situations. Such definitions and explanations serve a useful
purpose to the extent that they help to lead to similar results in
1. ' Borsa v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 207 Pa Super 63, 215 A2d 289,
291 (1965).
2. Palenscar v Bobb, 439 Pa 101, 266 A2d 478, 480 (1970).
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similar cases and serve to guide those responsible for evaluating
individuals' conduct and the merits of a given case. When, how-
ever, these verbal guidelines are transposed from a means to an
end into ends in and of themselves, then the ultimate goal of fair
and substantial justice is not furthered, but instead becomes ob-
scured by such definitions. Stated otherwise, when the courts be-
come more concerned with applying verbal tests than with deter-
mining the central issue which the tests are intended to illuminate,
the system has gone awry.
One area of the law in which such a transposition of focus has
occurred is that area which concerns the liability of possessors of
land, and specifically the cases involving slip-and-fall accidents in
modern supermarkets. One recalls from law school the traditional
common law distinctions between the duties a landowner or pos-
sessor of land owes to a trespasser, a licensee, and a business invi-
tee. Over time, however, the distinction between a licensee and a
business invitee has faded, and typically both are now entitled to
the protection traditionally accorded solely to the business invi-
tee.' In Pennsylvania, an invitee is entitled to have the highest de-
gree of care exercised toward her by a possessor of land.4 According
to Dean Prosser, this means that a land possessor "is under an af-
firmative duty to protect them [invitees], not only against dangers
of which he knows, but also against those which with reasonable
care he may discover." Thus, a possessor of land must not only
warn of or remedy known dangers, he must also, under the com-
mon law rule, make a reasonable inspection to discover such
dangers.'
In reaching this conclusion regarding the general duty of a land-
owner, Prosser referred back to the English case of Indermaur v
Dames.' Indermaur was decided in England over 125 years ago, at
a time when cars did not exist, mail was delivered by horse drawn
carts, and groceries and supplies in the United States were pur-
chased at the General Store on Main Street owned by a local resi-
dent. Since that time, however, merchandising and marketing have
3. See W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at 432, 433 (West,
5th ed 1984).
4. Lonsdale v Joseph Horne Co., 403 Pa Super 12, 587 A2d 810, 813 (1991). The
business invitee is owed a duty by the merchant to maintain the premises in a reasonably
safe condition for the contemplated uses thereof and the purpose for which the invitation
was extended. Borsa, 215 A2d at 292.
5. Keeton, Law of Torts at 419 (cited in note 3).
6. Crotty v Reading Industries, Inc., 237 Pa Super 1, 345 A2d 259, 262-63 (1975).
7. Crotty, 345 A2d at 262.
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undergone enormous changes. For example, in 1962, S.S. Kresge
Co. opened the first Kmart in Garden City, Michigan, carrying a
broad-based inventory of consumer products." More recently, in
the last decade we have seen the emergence of the supermarket
super-store from what used to be simply a grocery store. These
super-stores, operated in the Western Pennsylvania area by com-
panies such as Giant Eagle, Inc., Foodland, and Super Valu Stores,
Inc., offer the customer the convenience of one-stop shopping.
Moreover, they offer the merchant the reward of reaping a profit,
not only upon the grocery purchases which the consumer makes,
but also upon numerous other non-traditional items such as bakery
goods, flowers, salad bar dishes, pharmaceuticals, hardware and so
forth which are available at the store daily.
There are two fundamental questions which must be answered
for the purposes of this discussion. First, is the standard of care to
be required of such modern-day merchants to their customers the
same as the standard utilized in London in the 1800's? If so, the
second inquiry must focus upon what level of strictness or liberal-
ity should be utilized in applying such a standard.
While the determination of whether a given standard is "liberal"
or not depends fundamentally upon the shoes in which one is
standing,' it would appear logical that any standard should liber-
ally favor the consumer who is present to purchase the merchant's
wares and provide him with a tidy profit. Pennsylvania, however,
has not taken such an approach, and instead has maintained a le-
gal analysis in this area of the law which is more favorable to busi-
ness and commerce. While the Pennsylvania courts are certainly
capable of being on the cutting edge of legal analysis, they consist-
ently refrain from expanding the boundaries of liability in the area
of torts until the new path is not only discovered by others, but
virtually beaten into an unmistakable roadway toward the ends of
justice. This author submits that today the trial and appellate
courts in Pennsylvania are applying an incorrect and outdated
standard of care which unduly hampers the ability of the injured
slip and fall plaintiff to recover from the merchant-land possessor.
Moreover, this restrictive standard is being unnecessarily strictly
construed by the courts against the consumer and in favor of the
8. Sam Walton with John Huey, Sam Walton Recounts the Life of a Salesman, Time
52, 57 (June 15, 1992).
9. For example, to the injured plaintiff, a liberal standard expands the scope of the






Suppose that Jane Smith, 36 years old and a mother of two, en-
ters a SuperGroceries, Inc. supermarket to buy her weekly grocer-
ies. It is mid-day and the store is busy but not crowded. After get-
ting a grocery cart, she begins her trek through the produce aisle
located near the entrance to the store. After selecting several
items, she approaches the back of the produce area, where she
nears a self-service salad bar which SuperGroceries has recently in-
stalled. The salad bar contains a number of salad "fixin's," includ-
ing lettuce, grated cheese, sliced cucumbers, sliced peppers, green
peas, croutons, bacon bits, mixed fruit pieces, and salad dressings.
The salad bar is in the middle of a white linoleum floor area. There
is room to pass on either side of the salad bar to the rest of the
store beyond. At one end of the salad bar there are foam plates.
The plastic plate covers to keep the salad contained after it is
made are at the other end. The salad bar itself is a freestanding
island where the customer must hold the plate in one hand while
moving around the salad bar to select from the salad items availa-
ble. It is intended by SuperGroceries that the customer prepare his
or her own salad, cover it, and take it to the checkout registers at
the front of the store where it will be weighed and paid for by the
customer.
As Mrs. Smith nears the salad bar, pushing her cart with one
child in the child seat and one child walking along beside her, she
suddenly slips and falls to the ground. Her elbow and head strike
the floor in the fall. A customer in the produce area behind Mrs.
Smith rushes up to help her to her feet and to see if she is injured.
Both Mrs. Smith and the other customer look at the floor and see
a small puddle of what appears to be white cucumber seed salad
dressing with a heelmark through it, as well as several small
crushed green peas. Mrs. Smith looks at her shoe and notices sev-
eral more peas and traces of a white sauce clinging to the bottom
of her shoe. It is her determination that she slipped on one, or
both, of these materials.
By this time, the manager of the store has been called over. He
directs a stockboy to clean up the floor, and takes an accident re-
port from Mrs. Smith. It is the stockboy's duty to regularly clean
the floor in the produce and salad areas, as food items are often
dropped to the floor by employees and customers. The witness tells
the manager what she saw and gives her name and address. Mrs.
590 Vol. 31:587
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Smith asks the stockboy if he knew that the material was on the
floor; he indicates that he did not notice the material twenty-five
minutes before, the last time he had swept the floor. No one else
indicates that they had witnessed the fall.
It turns out that Mrs. Smith fractured her elbow in the fall. Fur-
thermore, she has suffered severe headaches for several years after-
wards. Mrs. Smith ultimately brings a suit against SuperGroceries,
Inc. alleging negligence in failing to maintain the floor in a safe
condition for a business patron. Her case in chief contains the facts
set forth above and her counsel has rested. Counsel for Super-
Groceries moves that the case be dismissed and an order of nonsuit
entered. What result can be anticipated and what result can be
considered just?
THE PENNSYLVANIA APPROACH
The last time the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed this
issue of landowner liability was in 1965 in the case of Martino v
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company.10 In Martino, the plaintiff
was shopping at a self-service A&P supermarket. As she was walk-
ing down the produce aisle with her cart, she slipped on a grape on
the floor and fell, suffering injuries. The evidence revealed that the
grapes were piled in a bin on one side of the aisle, the bags for
containing them were located in the middle of the aisle, and the
scale for weighing the grapes was located on the opposite side of
the aisle. An A&P employee further testified that: (1) grapes and
other produce items often fell on the floor; (2) customers often
walked upon and over such fallen items; and (3) one of his duties
was to keep the area free of debris. The plaintiff did not offer any
evidence regarding the length of time during which the grape was
on the floor.
At the close of the plaintiff's case, the trial court granted A&P's
motion for a nonsuit upon the basis that the plaintiff's evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and allowing her
every reasonable inference of fact therefrom, did not establish that
A&P knew or should have known of the presence of the grape on
the floor. In affirming the order of the trial court, the supreme
court's plurality opinion began with general statements to the ef-
fect that the plaintiff was required to establish A&P's negligence
and that the mere occurrence of an accident was not evidence of
10. 419 Pa 229, 213 A2d 608 (1965).
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negligence. 1 The court thereafter stated that the case was gov-
erned by section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to business
visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he (a)
knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition
which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk
to them.'2
Under this standard, the plaintiff was required to establish that
A&P knew or reasonably should have known of the presence of the
grape. Since A&P obviously denied knowledge of the presence of
that particular grape being on the floor at that particular time and,
in the court's opinion, the plaintiff had not introduced evidence
from which the jury could reach any conclusion about the cause of
the presence of the grape on the floor, the nonsuit was held to be
proper."3
Since the supreme court's decision in Martino, the superior
court has continually held onto the talismanic charm of the "no-
tice" requirement of section 343. The superior court case in this
area which is most often cited as controlling is Moultrey v The
Great A & P Company. 4 In Moultrey, the plaintiff slipped on a
cherry on the floor in the produce aisle at an A&P. Ms. Moultrey
could not say how the cherry got to the floor or how long it had
been there; nor did she offer evidence regarding how long it had
been since the floor was last cleaned. Based upon this evidence,
A&P was granted a compulsory nonsuit. In affirming the trial
court's order, the superior court's opinion highlighted several im-
11. Martino, 213 A2d at 610. This case was argued before Justices Bell, C.J., and Mus-
manno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O'Brien and Roberts, JJ. The plurality opinion written by
Justice O'Brien was joined by Chief Justice Bell and Justice Eagen. Justice Roberts con-
curred with the outcome upon the basis that the plaintiffs failed to establish that A&P
didn't exercise due care to ascertain the existence of the grape and in warning or correcting
the condition. Id. His terse opinion did not include the "notice" discussion of the plurality.
Justice Musmanno filed a typically eloquent and descriptive dissenting opinion which was
joined by Justices Jones and Cohen. Id at 610. Interestingly, none of these Justices are still
sitting on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
12. Id at 610 citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 343 (1965).
13. Martino, 213 A2d at 610. The court further reasoned that the act of displaying
unpackaged grapes seven feet across an aisle from the weighing scale was not negligence
since "every reasonable effort was made to keep the passageway clean." Id. Such a holding,
however, seems to clearly invade the province of the jury. This topic is more fully discussed
herein.
14. 281 Pa Super 525, 422 A2d 593 (1980). Interestingly, during the research con-
ducted for this commentary, it was observed that The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea com-
pany was the defendant in a large number of the slip and fall cases in many jurisdictions.
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portant principles in the area of slip and fall liability law which
were subsequently therein and everafter ignored by the Pennsylva-
nia courts.15 First, the court reiterated that it remained Pennsylva-
nia law that the plaintiffs evidence must tend to prove that the
proprietor either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care ought
to have known, of the existence of the harm-causing condition." If
the harmful transitory condition was traceable to the possessor,
then the plaintiff need not show further notice, since the possessor
was certainly on notice of his own acts.1 7 Further, the court stated
that where the condition was one which frequently recurred, the
jury could find that the owner had actual notice of the condition,
thereby obviating the need to establish constructive notice via evi-
dence that the condition existed uncorrected for such a length of
time that the owner, if exercising reasonable care, should have
known of it.'"
Most recently, these principles were stated but misapplied by
the superior court in Kotora v Giant Eagle Markets, Inc.'9 and
Myers v The Penn Traffic Company.2 0 In Kotora, the plaintiff
slipped on red salad dressing which had fallen from Giant Eagle's
self-service salad bar onto the red tile surrounding the salad bar.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Giant Ea-
gle, finding no evidence that it either. knew of the presence of the
sauce on the floor or that the sauce had remained on the floor for
such an extended period of time that constructive notice could be
inferred.2 The superior court affirmed this order, dismissing as
"absurd" the plaintiff's argument that the possessor's negligence
could be found in its selection of a floor covering the same color as
its dressing (thereby disguising the presence of any spills according
to the plaintiff) and refused to place upon the merchant "the oner-
ous burden of maintaining constant vigil over the salad bar to en-
15. Moultrey, 422 A2d at 594-96. As is discussed herein, while the superior court
stated that conditions which are either recurrent or traceable to the proprietor are chargea-
ble to the proprietor without further evidence of notice of the precise occurrence of the
hazardous condition in suit, the court has not applied these principles when presented with
obvious opportunities to do so. Compare the superior court's statements in Moultrey, 422
A2d at 596, with the courts' holdings in Kotura v Giant Eagle Markets, Inc. and Myers v
The Penn Traffic Company, cited at notes 19 and 20.
16. Moultrey, 422 A2d at 596.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. No 1313 Pittsburgh 1990, slip op (Pa Superior Ct, Oct 17, 1992).
20. 414 Pa Super 181, 606 A2d 926.
21. Kotora, slip op at 5.
1993
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sure that nothing ever spilled on the floor."22
Similarly, in Myers, after the plaintiff slipped on a grape in the
Riverside Market, the superior court affirmed the entry of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff
could not establish the period of time for which the grape had been
on the floor.2 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
recurrent presence of grapes on the floor could constitute actual
notice, and refused to find constructive notice from the defend-
ant's actions of stacking the grapes and selling them in unpackaged
bunches.2 '
Under the superior court's current analysis, Mrs. Smith is des-
tined to suffer a nonsuit at the point in her case where we left
her.25 She has no evidence that a store employee dropped the sauce
and peas on the floor, though one might have while stocking the
salad bar.2 Nor does she have evidence that the store, through its
employees, actually knew of the materials on the floor.27 Finally,
she does not have any evidence regarding how long the materials
had remained on the floor such that constructive notice could be
found. As the foregoing cases illustrate, under such circumstances,
the superior court has uniformly affirmed judgment against the
plaintiff. Mrs. Smith will therefore have to bear the costs of her
injuries herself.
. I. THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS MUST RECOGNIZE THAT A
RECURRING DANGER CAN BE SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO A POSSESSOR
OF LAND OF THE OCCURRENCE OF A PARTICULAR INSTANCE OF THE
DANGER
In the Moultrey case, the superior court stated that Pennsylva-
nia law recognizes that where a possessor knows that a dangerous
transitory condition frequently recurs, the jury may find actual no-
tice therefrom.28 This principle expresses recognition of the fact
22. Kotora, slip op at 5-6. For a contrary view, see Ciminski v Finn Corporation, Inc.,
13 Wash App 815, 537 P2d 850, 854 (1975), wherein the court stated that "The different
circumstances presented in the self-service operation may require the owner to take differ-
enct methods to protect his invitees. For example, the flooring substance should be chosen
with the fact in mind that customers handling food will be passing over it."
23. Myers, 606 A2d at 929.
24. Id at 930.
25. See generally the discussion of Kotura, Myers, and Moultrey above.
26. See discussion in Myers, 606 A2d at 930, and the cases cited therein.
27. This knowledge is required by Kotura, slip op at 4, as well as Moultrey, 422 A2d at
596.
28. Moultrey, 422 A2d at 596.
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that a merchant cannot simply walk blindly through his store,
avoiding direct eye contact with areas in which problems have
arisen in the past, and then claim that he did not know of a partic-
ular problem at a particular time. Instead, when a merchant knows
that a particular hazard is occurring repeatedly, then it is reasona-
ble to say that when it continues to occur, the merchant should be
charged with notice of the condition. What this principle impliedly
recognizes (though the courts refuse to abandon their "notice"
analysis) is that where a condition frequently recurs, the
merchant's act of negligence consists of allowing the environment
to continue to exist in a manner that fosters the recurrence of the
condition.
If, instead of correcting the cause of the recurring condition, the
merchant simply cleans it up each time, then it is foreseeable that
the condition will at some point recur when the merchant is not
immediately present. It is further foreseeable that during the pe-
riod of time between when the condition again occurs and when
the merchant finds it and cleans it up, a patron will be exposed to
the risk.2 If the patron then is injured as a result of the condition,
that clearly should be viewed as a foreseeable risk arising from the
merchant's continued employment of a method of doing business
which causes such a risk. 0 This is, in itself, negligence. Any at-
29. See F. W. Woolworth Co v Stokes, 186 Miss 621, 191 S2d 411, 417 (1966) citing
Shiflett v M. Timberlake, Inc, 205 Va 406, 137 SE2d 908, 911-12 (1964), stating that "many
courts take the opposite, and what we think is the better, view that a storekeeper is not
exempt from liability to an invitee who falls on a floor made wet and slippery by moisture
tracked in by customers during inclement weather. In our view, the liability of a storekeeper
in this type of case does not turn on whether the water on or dampness of the floor was
tracked in by other customers. It turns on whether, under the circumstances, the store-
keeper has exercised ordinary care to prevent a hazardous condition on his premises."
Woolworth, 191 S2d at 417. Applying this principle, the court in F.W. Woolworth Co. held
that it is not necessary to show actual knowledge of the condition at the time of the plain-
tiff's injury in a case alleging a recurring condition, as the store owner has knowledge of the
general hazardous condition of the floor as evidenced by his prior efforts to resolve the situ-
ation. Id at 416.
30. See Maugeri v Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 357 F2d 202 (3d Cir 1966),
wherein the plaintiff alleged injury after slipping on produce in the defendant's store, and
the court held that "[wihere the intervening act [of a customer dropping produce to the
floor from an open bin] is foreseeable, the defendant remains liable even if he does not have
notice of the condition created by it." Maugeri, 357 F2d at 203. See also Strack v Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 35 Wis 2d 51, 150 NW2d 361, 364 (1967), where the court held
that in the self-service supermarket context, "[w]hile we do not go so far as to change the
burden of proof, we think that in circumstances where there is a reasonable probability that
an unsafe conditon will occur because of the nature of the business and the manner in which
it is conducted, then constructive notice of the existence of such an unsafe condition may be
charged to the operator." Strack, 150 NW2d at 364.
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tempt to superimpose a "notice" requirement over this straight-
forward analysis is nothing other than an attempt to narrow the
limits of the merchant's liability.31 While such protection of com-
merce may be within the power of the court, it should not be un-
dertaken by the present approach whereby reasoned statements of
the law are followed by inconsistent application of the law to the
case before the court.
In the Myers case, however, the court refused to apply this prin-
ciple. 2 The plaintiff's evidence included testimony by the store's
employees that produce on the floor in the area where Ms. Myers
fell was a constant problem.33 Certainly, at the summary judgment
stage, it can be argued convincingly that this evidence created an
issue of fact regarding whether the merchant was, under the doc-
trine discussed in Moultrey, on actual notice of the condition by
virtue of its recurring nature. 34 Instead, however, the court entered
summary judgment in favor of the merchant.
In a case such as Kotura, such a recurring danger should also
have been submitted to the jury for a determination of whether or
not negligence existed. The Giant Eagle store in Kotura was utiliz-
ing a self-service salad bar. Common experience teaches us that
these salad bars contain numerous loose produce items and sauces
which are dripped onto the salad by the customer. The merchant
expects the customer to handle his own food.3" In fact, that is the
very reason for which these salad bars are used. In an earlier time,
such a salad would have been prepared by one of the store's em-
ployees and handed to the customer packaged. The modern
merchant, however, lets his customers do the work in order to cut
down on labor costs. As a result, the danger caused by food drop-
31. In Jasko v F. W. Woolworth, 177 Colo 418, 494 P2d 839, 840 (1972), the court
correctly held that "when the operating methods of a proprietor are such that dangerous
conditions are continuous or easily forseeable, the logical basis for the notice requirement
dissolves." Jasko, 494 P2d at 840.
32. Myers, 606 A2d at 928.
33. Id at 929.
34. Moultrey, 422 A2d at 596. "Where the condition is one which the owner knows has
frequently recurred, the jury may properly find that the owner had actual notice of the
condition, obviating additional proof by the invitee that the owner had constructive notice
of it." Id.
35. In Rhodes v El Rancho Markets, 4 Ariz App 183, 418 P2d 613 (1966), the court
took judicial notice of the merchant's expectation that the customer handle the food dis-
played in an open bin, and held that such a display requires the merchant to take reasona-
ble protective measures for the benefit of customers who might slip and fall on dropped
materials. Rhodes, 418 P2d at 615. The plaintiff therein was required only to establish that
the merchant's display could lead to a risk of harm, and that reasonable protective measures
were not taken by the merchant. On this basis the jury could infer negligence. Id.
596 Vol. 31:587
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ping, which used to be caused by the merchant's employees drop-
ping food, is now caused by the customers. The risk, however, re-
mains the same, and the merchant should have to bear the risk of
his business.3 6
In Mrs. Smith's case, the evidence could be found by a jury to
establish that the store was aware of the fact that food items fell to
the floor on a recurrent basis, posing a risk of harm to patrons.
Where SuperGroceries is aware of such a recurring danger, the
plaintiff should not be required to establish constructive or actual
notice by any other evidence, and the issue of SuperGroceries' neg-
ligence in failing to keep the premises safe should go to the jury.
Based upon the holdings of past cases, however, the superior court
would in all likelihood ultimately ignore this principle and Mrs.
Smith will be without a remedy.
Where a condition can reasonably be expected to recur, the
plaintiff should not be required to show that the merchant knew of
the particular spill of dressing, grape or leaf of lettuce which
caused the fall.37 The merchant has elected to utilize a self-service
manner of merchandising in order the cut his costs, increase vol-
ume, and advance his own interests. Thus, it is fair for him to bear
the burdens of the increased risks created thereby. 38 Notably, such
a requirement does not make the merchant an insurer of the prem-
ises safety. 9 If the merchant can establish that he acted reasona-
36. In Ciminski v Finn Corporation, Inc., 13 Wash App 815, 537 P2d 850 (1975),
where the plaintiff slipped on juice allegedly dripping on the floor from a self service cafete-
ria food bar, the court noted that "[in a self-service operation, an owner has for his pecuni-
ary benefit required customers to perform tasks previously carried out by employees. Thus,
the risk of items being dangerously located on the floor, which previously was created by the
employees, is now created by the customers. but it is the very same risk and the risk has
been created by the owner by his choice of mode of operations." Ciminski, 537 P2d at 853.
37. For another case supporting liability based upon recurring conditions, see Maho-
ney v J. C. Penney Co., 71 NM 244, 377 P2d 663 (1963) (Plaintiff slipped on stairs, alleging
recurring sticky substance).
38. Mahoney, 377 P2d at 673 ("If the jury or the trier of the facts should find an
absence of due care, and should further find that defendant could or should have reasonably
foreseen that his negligence could combine with that of a third person, then in such event it
is no longer necessary for a plaintiff to prove how long the specific piece of gum, food, etc.,
forming part of the dangerous general condition was present . . .Defendant then had the
affirmative duty of exercising ordinary care to keep the stairway in a safe condition.")
39. Applying this standard in Ciminski v Finn Corporation Inc., cited at note 36, the
court stated that "This rule does not create a higher standard of care for self-service opera-
tions. It is axiomatic that a property owner or occupier is required to use reasonable care
towards his business invitees." Ciminski, 537 P2d at 850. See also Bozza v Vornado, Inc., 42
NJ 354, 200 A2d 777 (1964) where the court stated "[o]nce plaintiff introduces evidence
which raises an inference of negligence, defendant may then negate the inference by submit-
ting evidence of due care. Thus, it could not be said that this makes the proprietor an
1993
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bly in response to the recurring condition, either by attempting to
correct the condition or by policing the premises with a degree of
vigilance which a jury finds to be reasonable, then the plaintiff's
action should and will fail. If the merchant has not acted reasona-
bly in response to a known source of recurrent danger, however,
then liability for this failure should properly attach. Thus, to the
extent that the courts are refusing to recognize this proposition
and are not permitting the jury to make the determination of the
reasonableness of the merchant's response to a recurring threat,
the courts are improperly limiting the plaintiff's right to recovery.
II. THE MERCHANT'S ACT OF CREATING THE CONDITION WHICH
LEADS TO THE RISK OF HARM IS NEGLIGENCE
Moultrey also restated the well-established principle that when
a harmful transitory condition is traceable to the merchant, the
plaintiff does not need to establish notice. 0 "Where one creates a
dangerous condition by his own antecedent active conduct, it is un-
necessary to prove that he had notice of such condition.""1 Where,
however, the evidence indicates that the transitory condition is
traceable to persons other than those for whom the owner is,
strictly speaking, ordinarily accountable, the jury may not consider
the owner's liability without evidence of notice.42 Thus, the focus
of this test centers upon when a condition is to be considered
"traceable" to a merchant. When an employee has thrown or
dropped the 'item onto the floor, then the condition has been held
to be traceable.43 In the open-produce or self-service salad bar
cases, however, the Pennsylvania courts have not found the condi-
tion of the floor to be traceable to the merchant, though without
satisfactory explanation.""
In Martino, the grapes were stored across the aisle from the
insurer." Bozza, 200 A2d at 780.
40. Moultrey, 422 A2d at 596.
41. Finney v G.C. Murphy Co., 406 Pa 555, 178 A2d 719 (1962). In Finney, the plain-
tiff slipped on a pool of oil on a department store floor which had apparently been freshly
oiled for appearance.
42. Moultrey, 422 A2d at 596.
43. See Jewell v Beckstine, 255 Pa Super 238, 386 A2d 597 (1978), where the defend-
ant was found to have tracked cow manure onto a set of steps in a barn.
44. In the Pennsylvania cases cited above, the courts have consistently focused on the
lack of evidence that the merchant was actually responsible for dropping the food item onto
the floor. In so approaching the issue, however, the courts have failed to address the argu-
ment that the merchant's antecedent conduct created the likelihood that someone else
would drop the food item on the floor.
598 Vol. 31:587
Comments
scale used to weigh them.4" This placement of the grapes and the
scale was planned and established by the merchant. If the focus of
negligence law is upon the avoidance of foreseeable unreasonable
risks of harm, then it does not require any contortion of logical
analysis to say that when a grape falls from a patron's grape clus-
ter while passing from the counter to the distant scale, then the
grape's presence on the floor is traceable to the merchant's deci-
sion to separate the two. To illustrate this point, contemplate a
scenario where a stockboy piles jars of mayonnaise precariously
high into the air, and as a result of a patron's attempt to select a
jar, one jar from the top of the pile falls onto the head of a cus-
tomer. In such a situation the courts would certainly hold that the
injury could be found to have been caused by the merchant's negli-
gence in so stacking the jars.
Where the jar misses the customer and instead falls to the floor
after being jostled by the customer, spreading its white slippery
contents across the linoleum, the same foreseeable event has oc-
curred: the jar has fallen from its precarious perch. The Martino
court, however, would apparently not find the latter event to be
negligence on the part of the merchant until the merchant knew or
should have known that the jar had fallen." The difficulty
presented by such a conclusion is that if it was foreseeable that the
jar would fall onto a customer, then it is equally, if not more, likely
that the jar would fall onto the floor. The dictates of logical consis-
tency, therefore, require the court to allow the jury to find the
foreseeability of this risk. If it was foreseeable that the jar (or loose
cherries, grapes or peas) would fall from the spot where they were
initially placed by the merchant, then when that very event occurs,
its occurrence is directly traceable to the merchant's act of display-
ing the items in the chosen manner.47
Applying this analysis to Mrs. Smith's case, it was the merchant
who decided to install a salad bar in his store. The merchant has
45. Martino, 213 A2d at 611 (Musmanno dissenting).
46. Martino, 213 A2d at 610.
47. In Little v Butner, 186 Kan 75, 348 P2d 1022, 1030 (1960), where the plaintiff
slipped on meat particles in a store distributing free samples, the court held that "[t]he
dangerous condition here alleged was created and negligently maintained by the defendants
in agreeing to, and carrying on, the demonstration in a manner which they knew, or with the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, would render the premises unsafe . . . [I]t is
not unreasonable to assume that parts of such samples will be dropped to the floor and
stepped upon by customers and patrons making the floor slick, slippery and dangerous to
walk upon . . . . The over-all condition was created by the defendants in carrying on the
demonstration without taking the precaustions." Little, 348 P2d at 1030.
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encouraged his customers to handle the loose food items sitting in
the salad bar, including spoonfuls of peas and ladles of salad dress-
ing. A customer may reasonably be expected to drop some items
onto the floor even if acting with the highest degree of care. In
addition, the merchant can reasonably expect that not all of his
customers will act with the highest concern for their fellow shop-
pers' safety, so that such spills may be common. The ultimate
presence of the sauce and peas on the floor is, therefore, a foresee-
able result of SuperGroceries' election to utilize a self-service salad
bar with loose produce items. The presence of the salad bar items
on the floor is therefore traceable to SuperGroceries, and Mrs.
Smith's injuries may properly be found to be the result of Super-
Groceries' creation of an environment which caused the dangerous
condition to occur.
III. THE COURTS MUST BE WILLING TO APPLY SECTION 344 OF
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS TO SUPERMARKETS
Despite the oft repeated language in the Pennsylvania cases to
the effect that the duty of a landowner in Pennsylvania is defined
by section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that section
is only one formulation of the landowner's general duty of care."
Section 344 further defines this general duty as it applies to a
merchant utilizing his land for a place of business. This section
reads as follows:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his busi-
ness purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are
upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the acciden-
tal, negligent or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and
by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm or oth-
erwise to protect them against it.4
Moreover, comment f to section 344 indicates that this section
includes a duty on the part of the merchant to look for dangerous
conditions, even if they are caused by customers rather than em-
ployees, and even though they may not be present for a sufficient
period of time that the merchant should know of their precise exis-
tence. Comment f states, in pertinent part, that:
48. Martino, 213 A2d at 610; Borsa v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 215 A2d
at 289.
49. Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 344.
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He may, however, know or have reason to know, from past experience, that
there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in general which
is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he has no reason
to expect it on the part of any particular individual. If the place or charac-
ter of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably
anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either
generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take pre-
cautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of ser-
vants to afford a reasonable protection."0
Section 344 therefore imposes a duty upon the merchant to
search for dangerous conditions which his customers may have
caused if the merchant reasonably should suspect these dangerous
conditions may occur from time to time. It is not enough for the
merchant to say that the condition was not present for a long
enough period of time that he should have discovered it with a
reasonable inspection. Instead, Comment f to section 344 indicates
that the land possessor must: (1) actively search for such dangers
when they can be expected to occasionally occur, (2) protect the
customer from such dangers, and (3) provide sufficient staff to
carry out these duties.5"
Applying section 344's analysis in the area of supermarket slip
and falls, the merchant is plainly on notice that the self service
"character of his business" results in a risk of food items being
carelessly or accidently dropped on the floor by customers. Fur-
ther, "his past experience" teaches him that such conduct will in
fact occur. The merchant must therefore employ sufficient staff to
inspect the premises in a reasonable fashion and/or present his
products in a manner which will mitigate such risks.52 The ques-
tions of whether staff levels are reasonable and whether the pre-
cautions taken by the merchant are reasonable would appear to be
issues best left to the jury to decide upon the basis of their
experience.
In the Moultrey case, the superior court refused to hold that sec-
tion 344 applied to supermarkets, finding no Pennsylvania appel-
late case indicating that supermarkets were within the scope of the
section, although this section had been applied to other landown-
ers.53 Recently however, the superior court did hold that section
50. Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 344, comment f.
51. Moran v Valley Forge Drive-in Theater, Inc., 431 Pa 432, 246 A2d 875, 878 (1968).
52. Regarding product presentation, the merchant could elect to wrap all of the pro-
duce items in cellophane, package them in advance, or employ workers to handle the pro-
duce for the customers.
53. Compare Moultrey, 422 A2d at 597 n 8, with Carswell v. Southeastern Pa Trans-
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344 applied to a supermarket.6 Nevertheless, the courts have not
since uniformly recognized its application. For example, in the case
of Myers v The Penn Traffic Company,5 the superior court de-
clined to apply a section 344 analysis to a slip and fall case where
the plaintiff had slipped on red salad dressing on the floor near a
salad bar in a supermarket. The court, affirming summary judg-
ment in favor of the merchant, held that the plaintiffs failure to
specifically invoke section 344 as a basis of recovery prevented the
court from considering its applicability." As noted in Judge Wie-
and's dissent, however, the plaintiff's primary duty is only to intro-
duce evidence, while it is the role of the court to apply the law to
the facts found on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence. 7 In Myers,
the plaintiff had produced evidence that the merchant knew that
debris and produce regularly fell to the floor in the area of the
plaintiff's fall.58 This condition was recognized by the merchant to
present a risk which required frequent attention and cleaning." At
the time of plaintiff's fall, all of the attendants were on a break.60
Plaintiff testified that she slipped on a grape on the floor in the
produce area.61 Plaintiff's argument was essentially that the store
failed to police the premises sufficiently.62 Thus, while section 344
was not expressly cited in the plaintiff's brief on appeal, the issue
of negligence evidenced by improper inspection was clearly
raised.6 3 Since "it is the duty of [the] reviewing court to examine
the entire [factual] record and determine whether the facts there
appearing will support a recovery under any theory, whether or not
that theory has been argued by the plaintiff-appellant,"' 64 Judge
Wieand, in his dissent, would have applied the principles of law
contained within section 344 to the facts presented by the plain-
portation Authority, 259 Pa Super 167, 393 A2d 770 (1978), applying Section 344 to a train
station; and Moran v. Valley Forge Drive-in Theatre Inc., et al, 246 A2d 875 (1968), apply-
ing Section 344 to a drive-in theater.
54. Miller v Peter J. Schmitt & Co, Inc., 405 Pa Super 502, 592 A2d 1324, 1334-35
(1991).
55. 414 Pa Super 181, 606 A2d 926, 928 (1992).
56. Myers, 606 A2d at 928.
57. Id at 930.
58. Id at 928.
59. Id.
60. Id at 930.
61. Id at 928.
62. Id at 927.
63. Id at 928.
64. Id at 933.
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tiff.65 If the court was genuine in its prior expression that section
344 was to be applied in Pennsylvania, then it should not have
been reluctant to do so in an obviously appropriate case such as
Myers.
IV. IT IS MORE EQUITABLE TO PLACE THE BURDEN UPON THE
POSSESSOR TO ESTABLISH THAT HE HAS EXERCISED REASONABLE
CARE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
Under traditional negligence analysis, the plaintiff bears the bur-
den of proving that the defendant-possessor's conduct failed to
satisfy his duty of care owed to the plaintiff."' Using the typical
notice requirement adhered to by the courts, this requires the
plaintiff to show either that: (a) the merchant knew that there was
a substance on the floor or (b) that the condition existed for such
an extended period of time that a reasonable inspection would
have disclosed its existence, such that it may be said that the
merchant. had constructive notice of the danger.6 7 Oftentimes, the
plaintiff is unable to satisfy either of these requirements and his or
her case is therefore dismissed. This failure on the part of the
plaintiff to "make the case," however, is not due to a lack of dili-
gence on his own part. (Instead, it is frequently a natural result of
the fact that the information required to satisfy the burden, if any
such information exists, is held by the merchant).
When a court is determining who bears the burden of proof re-
garding a particular issue, it would appear just to place the burden
upon the party who is in a position to have superior knowledge or
access to knowledge to prove or disprove the point.6 8 Yet, for the
slip and fall plaintiff to establish constructive notice of a danger-
ous transitory condition, he or she must produce a witness who can
state that they observed the offending material on the floor at a
time significantly prior to the plaintiff encountering it.69 This is a
65. Id.
66. Lonsdale v Joseph Horne Co., 403 Pa Super 12, 587 A2d 810 (1991).
67. Borsa, 215 A2d at 291-92.
68. In Wollerman v Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 NJ 431, 221 A2d 513 (1966), where
the court shifted the burden to the merchant to show due care, the court noted that "[t]he
customer is hardly in a position to know precisely which was the neglect. Overall the fair
probability is that defendant did less than its duty demanded in one respect or another...
It is just, therefore, to place the onus of producing evidence on upon the party who is pos-
sessed of superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the causative circum-
stances." Wollerman, 221 A2d at 514-15.
69. In most cases, such a witness to the prior existence of the transitory condition will
be the only manner to establish that the condition existed the requisite length of time
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particularly difficult burden for the plaintiff because in most su-
permarkets, the store is set up in a series of aisles through which
customers move in a predictable pattern. It is certainly not in-
tended by the merchant that its customers will repeatedly retrace
their steps while shopping, such that a potential witness would
first witness the unsafe condition of the floor, and then later return
to the area after the accident and come forward as a witness. While
the appearance of such a witness is not unheard of, it is not an
event which can reasonably be expected to result in the production
of a constructive notice witness in the vast majority of cases. As a
result, unless the plaintiff is fortunate enough to find a customer
who had been down the aisle previously and spotted the harmful
substance on the floor, her case will fail.
7°
Conversely, the merchant is in an excellent position to establish
that it has met its duty of care. Such proof by the merchant re-
quires only that he establish that a reasonable inspection of the
premises was made prior to the accident.7' Moreover, this is not an
onerous duty to place upon the merchant. The merchant already
has a duty to act reasonably to protect his customers from these
risks of harm.72 All that this analysis does is shift the burden from
the ignorant plaintiff to the merchant with access to the informa-
tion necessary to satisfy this burden. 73 The fiction of "constructive
knowledge" of the condition could then be eliminated and the in-
quiry again focused upon the true issue: whether the merchant
before the plaintiff's injury. There are few other practical alternatives in the majority of
cases by which the plaintiff can establish that a reasonable merchant would have detected
the danger.
70. Obviously, if the plaintiff can find that one of the merchant's employees was aware
of the condition, actual notice will have been shown, and constructive notice would only
become relevant if the merchant had acted reasonably after learning of the spill. In such a
case, constructive notice via a previous customer would still be necessary to establish that
the condition was present for a period of time before the merchant discovered it, such that
it should reasonably have been discovered earlier, even though the merchant did act with all
due haste to remedy the condition once it was discovered.
71. Bozza v Vornado, Inc., 42 NJ 354, 200 A2d 777, 780 (1964) ("Once plaintiff in-
troduces evidence which raises an inference of negligence, defendant may then negate the
inference by submitting evidence of due care.").
72. As stated in Borsa, "Mrs. Borsa, a business visitor, was owed by appellant the
affirmative duty of keeping its premises reasonably safe for business visitors and of warning
of any failure to maintain them in that condition, and she was entitled to rely on appellant's
performance of this duty." Borsa, 215 A2d at 292.
73. In Kavlich v Kramer, 315 So2d 282 (La 1975), the court adopted a standard
whereby once the victim has proven that a substance on the floor caused her to slip, the
store operator has the burden of going forward with "evidence to exculpate itself from the
presumption that it was negligent." Kavlich, 315 So2d at 285
Vol. 31:587
took reasonable steps to protect his customers from foreseeable
risks of harm. That is the question which is ultimately to be de-
cided and it can be more fairly determined by requiring the
merchant to show the exercise of due care.
Mrs. Smith, under such an analysis, would still be required to
establish that a dangerous condition existed on the floor and that
the existence of this danger caused her to suffer injury. After she
has satisfied this burden, however, the burden of proof would then
shift to SuperGroceries to establish that it exercised due care for
the safety of its customers. If SuperGroceries can then show due
care, it has a complete affirmative defense to the plaintiff's case.
Conversely, if the merchant cannot show due care, then the jury
may properly enter an award in favor of Mrs. Smith for the dam-
ages caused by SuperGroceries' failure to exercise due care.
CONCLUSION
The modern supermarket and its increasingly self-service nature
is fraught with perils for its customers. Antiquitous notions of en-
couraging commerce at the expense of the consumer no longer rule
the nation as they did during the Industrial Revolution, and yet,
the Pennsylvania courts continue to be reluctant to apply the pre-
sent law to favor the customer who is injured as a result of food
items dropping to the floor. Moreover, the courts are not willing to
expand the scope of the law any further. As a result, in many cases
the jury is not allowed to consider the very issue which it is most
able to decide, namely, whether particular conduct by a merchant
satisfies the community's understanding of the standard of reason-
able care. To properly resolve the conflicts which are continually
arising between injured customers and supermarket operators, the
Pennsylvania courts must be willing to invoke one or more of the
analyses discussed herein: (1) finding actual notice of a dangerous
condition from the recurring nature of the condition; (2) finding
actual notice through the merchant's antecedent conduct in creat-
ing the self-service environment which fostered the development of
the hazardous condition; (3) finding a duty to maintain and police
the supermarket premises as a result of the merchant's past expe-
rience with produce debris and the character of the self-service su-
permarket; and (4) shifting the burden of proof regarding the pe-
riod of time which the hazardous condition existed from the
plaintiff to the defendant. To the extent that the court is continu-
ing to decide that the general condition of a self-service grocery
store can not be sufficient evidence of negligence without notice to
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the merchant of a specific instance constituting a hazardous condi-
tion, it is unnecessarily usurping a power from the jury which is
properly within their dominion, and it is stripping the plaintiff of
something which is rightfully his or hers: a remedy under the law.
Mark T. Coulter
